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ARGUMENT
Because There Was Ample Evidence That Corroborated Barker’s and Bittick’s
Testimony, The District Court Erroneously Concluded That There Was Insufficient
Evidence To Sustain Anderson’s Convictions
A.

Introduction
While accomplice testimony must be corroborated to sustain a conviction, even

“threadbare” inferential evidence will satisfy the corroboration requirement. See State v.
Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 892, 216 P.3d 648, 651 (2009). Here, the district court found “the
only evidence linking Anderson to possession of the controlled substances and possession
of paraphernalia” was the testimony of his accomplices, Barker and Bittick; it further
concluded there was insufficient corroboration of that testimony. (R., p. 181.) This was
an error, as there was ample corroboration of Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony—the track
marks on Anderson’s arm, the timing of his admitted relapse, and his own admissions
that he used drugs while staying with Barker and Bittick.
Anderson responds that with respect to the methamphetamine possession charge,
the state did not preserve its claim that the methamphetamine residue found in the pipe
could have supported the conviction. (Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.) Further, Anderson
argues that “the timing of Mr. Anderson’s relapse, the track marks on his arms, and his
admission to using heroin, do not corroborate” his accomplices’ testimony.
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-11 (capitalization altered).)
These arguments fail. The state did preserve its argument that the pipe residue
could have supported Anderson’s conviction for methamphetamine possession.
Moreover, with respect to every count, the jury heard ample evidence that corroborated
his accomplices’ testimony.
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B.

The State’s Argument That Methamphetamine Residue Could Have Supported
The Conviction For Possession Of Methamphetamine Is Preserved In The Record
And Supported On Appeal
Anderson contends the state’s claim that the methamphetamine residue could have

supported the methamphetamine possession conviction is not preserved or otherwise
unsupported on appeal. (Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.) However, a review of the record
shows the state did preserve the issue of whether methamphetamine residue, found in a
pipe outside the lockbox, could have substantiated the jury verdict.
“The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are
Roe v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580,

raised for the first time on appeal.”

21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001). In addition, an adverse ruling is a prerequisite to appellate
review. Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., No. 44053, 2017
WL 2644707, at *6 (Idaho June 20, 2017); Am. Semiconductor., Inc. v. Sage Silicon
Sols., LLC, 162 Idaho 119, 395 P.3d 338, 353 (2017), reh’g denied (June 8, 2017).
The record reveals the state explicitly argued at the Rule 29 motion hearing that
the methamphetamine pipe residue could have supported the methamphetamine charge:
But what we aren’t always addressing, there’s essentially two pieces of
evidence that pertain to the possession of Methamphetamine, and then
there’s the three pieces of evidence that pertain to the paraphernalia
charge.
So, I mean, if the baggie of Methamphetamine is thrown out, we still have
the pipe for the charge of Methamphetamine. However, if the heroin
charge is dismissed, of course there’s no alternative object or evidence in
relation to the heroin charge.
(Tr., p. 152, Ls. 4-13 (emphasis added).) Based on this there could be no confusion that
the state’s position was: 1) the baggie of methamphetamine in the lockbox was not the
only evidence that could have supported a methamphetamine charge; and 2) that
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assuming, arguendo, there was insufficient evidence that Anderson possessed the baggie,
the state would “still have the pipe for the charge of methamphetamine.” (Tr., p. 152,
Ls. 4-13; ----see also R., pp. 169-70 (arguing the officer’s “discovery of the glass pipe, later
confirmed to contain methamphetamine … corroborates Barker’s testimony that it was
Defendant’s and he placed it there”).) When the district court affirmed Anderson’s Rule
29 motion, it was therefore, by necessity, ruling against this theory and preserving it for
appeal.
Moreover, the state plainly renewed this argument on appeal:
The state also contends that even assuming, arguendo, there was
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of the heroin
found within the lockbox, there was nevertheless ample evidence to
support a conviction possession of the methamphetamine found outside the
lockbox, as explained herein.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8, n. 4 (emphasis added).) In explaining why the court was wrong
to dismiss the methamphetamine charge based on lockbox-items only (see Appellant’s
brief, p. 15), the state’s briefing restated this argument in the clearest possible terms:
As alluded to below, the state concedes on appeal that there was
insufficient evidence to show that Anderson—or for that matter anyone
other than Barker’s imprisoned boyfriend—could access the heroin found
in the lockbox. (See Tr., p. 152, Ls. 9-13.) However, as argued below
and herein, this has no bearing on the methamphetamine pipe found
outside the lockbox, which ample evidence shows Anderson possessed.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 15, n. 5 (emphasis added).) This argument was therefore made
below, restated on appeal, and is plainly preserved for appellate review.
Anderson claims this argument has not been preserved or is unsupported for three
reasons: 1) “[f]irst, the State failed to provide this Court with a transcript of either its
opening or closing arguments; thus, the State failed to provide an adequate record
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showing the jury’s verdict may have been based on this theory”; 2) “in arguing against
Mr. Anderson’s Rule 29 motion, the prosecuting attorney did not argue the residue found
in the pipe was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the possession of the
methamphetamine charge”; and 3) “the State fails to support such a claim (if it is raising
such a claim) with argument and authority.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)
These arguments fail. As for Anderson’s first challenge, he applies the wrong
legal standard by asking whether the record shows the state articulated a particular theory
of the case in its opening and closing arguments. Arguments are not evidence. See State
v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86,
156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). Moreover, a review of a Rule 29 motion simply asks
“whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho
679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004) (emphasis added).
Turning to the elements here, Anderson was not charged with “possession of
methamphetamine in a lockbox,” or “possession of non-residue methamphetamine.” He
was charged with possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 60.) And there was ample
evidence, based on the pipe alone, from which the jury could have found the elements of
that crime: the jury heard that Anderson smoked methamphetamine with a glass pipe
(Tr., p. 69, L. 15 – p. 70, L. 5); that the pipe was used by Anderson on or about February
17 to smoke methamphetamine (see Tr., p. 35, L. 24 – p. 36, L. 10); that Anderson
personally picked up the pipe and put it in the bedroom (Tr., p. 37, 16-23; p. 41, L. 24 –
p. 43, 8); that the pipe was found in the bedroom closet and recognizable as specifically
Anderson’s (Tr., p. 44, L. 22 – p. 45, L. 7; p. 69, L. 15 – p. 70, L. 5; p. 103, Ls. 1-3); that
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it appeared to an officer to be a methamphetamine pipe (Tr., p. 92, L. 23 – p. 93, L. 2);
and that it contained residue that later tested positive for methamphetamine (Tr., p. 143,
L. 25 – p. 144, L. 19; State’s Ex. 5).

Accordingly, whether the state sufficiently

articulated the significance of the pipe in non-evidentiary argument misses the point. The
record plainly shows the jury heard abundant evidence, pertaining to the pipe alone, from
which it could have found the elements of the charge.
Anderson’s preservation argument is likewise misplaced, because it fails to
acknowledge that the state specifically argued below that the pipe could have sustained
the methamphetamine charge. Anderson contends the state did not make this argument
but a review of the record shows that it did. (Compare Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5 with
Tr., p. 152, Ls. 4-13.)
Lastly, Anderson makes the generalized charge that the state “fail[ed] to support”
the methamphetamine pipe claim “with argument and authority in its Appellant’s Brief.”
(Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)

However, the state not only restated the theory

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8, n. 4; p. 15, n. 5) and the facts that supported it on appeal
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 1-3), but discussed at length the heart of the issue: how Anderson’s
testimony sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony, which included the
testimony that he had methamphetamine (see Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16 (“Given the
logic of Stone,
- - - one can readily and reasonably infer from Anderson’s heroin admissions
that he also used methamphetamine.”)).
The claim that the jury could have convicted Anderson of methamphetamine
possession based on the methamphetamine pipe was plainly presented below, and restated
and supported on appeal. That claim is therefore preserved for review.
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C.

The Timing Of Anderson’s Relapse, The Track Marks On His Arm, And
Anderson’s Own Statements About His Drug Use While In Barker’s House
Corroborated Barker’s And Bittick’s Testimony
A conviction cannot be based “on the testimony of an accomplice” unless the

testimony “is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the
offense.” I.C. § 19-2117. But the requisite “corroborating evidence may be slight, need
only go to one material fact and may be entirely circumstantial.” State v. Campbell,
114 Idaho 367, 370, 757 P.2d 230, 232 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Evans, 102 Idaho 461,
463, 631 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1981); State v. Brown, 53 Idaho 576, 581, 26 P.2d 131, 133
(1933). In fact, even “threadbare,” inferential evidence will satisfy the corroboration
requirement. See Stone, 147 Idaho at 892, 216 P.3d at 651. The Stone Court considered
whether slight and purely inferential evidence would be sufficient to corroborate the
accomplice testimony:
We agree with the district court’s characterization of both the strength and
sufficiency of the corroborative evidence. As noted, corroborative
testimony may be “slight” and need only “tend” to connect the defendant
to the crime. Stone’s unsolicited knowledge of the names of the
individuals involved, and the motive for the crime, could reasonably be
inferred to indicate more involvement than a passive recipient of news.
Even a highly plausible innocent explanation of the evidence “does not
strip the evidence of its corroborative character.” Moreover, one is entitled
to reasonably question why Stone would initially claim not to be in
Blackfoot and then change his story if he had no connection at all to the
incident.
Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651.

The Stone Court accordingly found that “[s]ufficient

corroborative evidence was presented at trial to sustain the verdicts,” and affirmed. Id.
Anderson argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence corroborating
the testimony of his accomplices. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-11.) Specifically, Anderson
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argues that the heroin found in the house was inaccessible, and by necessity could not
have been possessed by him. (Respondent’s brief, p. 8.) Moreover, he argues that the
timing of his relapse, the track marks on his arms, and his admissions of heroin use would
only corroborate testimony about a possession of heroin charge—not possession of
methamphetamine. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-11.) Anderson, like the district court
before him, therefore concludes that the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated, and
insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-11.)
But Anderson errs by applying a far-too stringent test for corroboration, and in
doing so, contradicts the applicable case law.

Anderson’s essential point is that

corroborating statements about using heroin can only be used to corroborate a charge of
heroin possession, and not methamphetamine. (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-9, 11.)
This is an error.
As set forth in the Stone case, even evidence of innocent acts can be used to
corroborate the entirety of an accomplices’ testimony concerning altogether different
illegal acts. See 147 Idaho at 892-93, 216 P.3d at 650-51. This is because courts can
infer that testimony is true even if the corroborating evidence only goes to one material
fact, and does not corroborate every detail of the charged acts. See id. Stone exemplified
this rule; there the only corroborating evidence was the defendant’s knowledge of the
accomplices’ names and the fact that he changed his story. Id.
Critically, the Stone Court did not hold that evidence directly pertaining to a
robbery was the only thing that could corroborate a robbery charge. See id. Nor did the
Court hold knowledge of names could only corroborate news consumption habits, or that
evidence of a changed story could only corroborate faulty memory. See id. Instead, the
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Court corroborated his accomplices’ robbery testimony based solely on inferences drawn
from Stone’s non-robbery admissions, and concluded there was sufficient evidence to
uphold the jury verdict. Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651 (“Stone’s unsolicited knowledge of
the names of the individuals involved, and the motive for the crime, could reasonably be
inferred to indicate more involvement than a passive recipient of news.… Moreover, one
is entitled to reasonably question why Stone would initially claim not to be in Blackfoot
and then change his story if he had no connection at all to the incident.”).
Applying that standard here quickly resolves this case.

Barker and Bittick

testified that Anderson used heroin and methamphetamine, at Barker’s house, on or about
February 17. (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 6-19; p. 47, Ls. 11-13; p. 67, L. 4 – p. 68, L. 7.) Anderson
likewise admitted to using heroin with Barker and Bittick, at Barker’s house, on or about
February 17, and he had track marks reflecting intravenous drug use. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 915; p. 20, L. 18 – p. 21, L. 1; p. 25, L. 25 – p. 26, L. 20; p. 27, Ls. 18-25.) Applying the
rule from Stone one can readily infer that Anderson’s statements corroborated Barker’s
and Bittick’s testimony, as it verifies multiple material details and mirrors their testimony
in nearly every respect. See 147 Idaho at 891-92, 216 P.3d at 649-50. The fact that
Anderson did not specifically confirm that he was smoking methamphetamine is
inconsequential. If Stone stands for anything, it is that the entirety of an accomplice’s
testimony can be corroborated based on inferences drawn from the defendant’s
statements. Here, inferring that Anderson used both of the drugs his accomplices said he
did, based on his own admission to using one of the drugs, is a common-sense inference,
and straightforward application of the rule in Stone.
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Anderson leaves Stone unturned on appeal, citing it in passing, but declining to
address the state’s argument that it resolves this case. (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-9.)
In particular, Anderson does not explain how his theory of the case—that heroin
admissions can only corroborate heroin charges—explains the result in Stone, where the
defendant’s statements were not about robberies, but nevertheless corroborated the
testimony that he was a robbery getaway driver. See 147 Idaho at 891-92, 216 P.3d at
649-50.
Because the district court erroneously found that Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony
was not corroborated, it incorrectly concluded the evidence was insufficient to sustain
Anderson’s convictions for possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia.
Construing the facts and inferences in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, the jury
correctly found that the evidence supported a guilty verdict.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the order of the district court and
remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of September, 2017.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans___________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of September, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KDG/dd

_/s/ Kale D. Gans__________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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